How Abstract Liberty Relates to Private Property: a One-Page Outline J C Lester 2/9/20 Libertarianism-and classical liberalism generally-presupposes (or entails) a specific, but implicit, conception of liberty. Imagine two lists of property-rights: one list is all those that are libertarian; the other list is all those that are not. What determines into which list a propertyright is assigned? If libertarianism is really about liberty, then the determining factor must be whether the property-right fits what liberty is (in a sense more abstract than property). It greatly clarifies matters to have an explicit theory of this presupposed conception. 'Liberty' in its most general sense means 'absence of constraint' (a relevant contrast is 'presence of assistance'). The issue here is interpersonal liberty: the absence of constraint on people by each other. But what is to be unconstrained? At its most abstract, this must be the satisfaction (or fulfilment) of our wants (or preferences). Merely not assisting a wantsatisfaction (not providing a benefit/gain) is quite different from proactively constraining that want-satisfaction (proactively imposing a cost/loss). Therefore, abstract liberty is 'the absence of interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-satisfaction'. But for useful brevity, 'no proactively imposed costs' or simply 'no (proactive) impositions'. This eleutherology is the abstract-not propertarian or normative-perfect liberty that libertarianism presupposes. There are three obvious problems with this: clashes, defences, and rectifications. 1) What if our want-satisfactions clash? I want to do something that proactively imposes on you (say by causing smoke), but to stop me would also proactively impose on me (I need fire for warmth and cooking). The most libertarian option is to minimise overall proactive impositions, with situation-specific compromise or compensation. 2) How far can one go to defend oneself from proactive impositions? No so far as to cause 'overkill': to proactively impose by exceeding anything that is threatened (e.g., mining one's garden to stop children using it as a shortcut). 3) If a proactive imposition occurs, then what would rectify it? Restitution matching the imposition; including any risk-multiplier proportional to the statistical chance of the imposer's escaping detection. Some broad interpersonal comparisons of normal costimpositions are unavoidable. These solutions constitute a liberty-maximisation policy. If such abstract liberty were to be applied or observed in a state of nature, then what general things would this entail? Primarily, people want to have ultimate control of the bodies that they more or less are. They do not proactively impose on other people by having this, unless trivially and reciprocally by merely existing and being composed of resources now unavailable. Therefore, liberty entails that they have this. Next, they want to have ultimate control of any unused resources they start using, and thereby closely involve in their wantsatisfactions. They do not proactively impose on other people by having this, unless trivially and reciprocally by their chosen use and those resources now being unavailable. Therefore, liberty entails that they have this. Otherwise, all interpersonal interactions and exchanges need to be consensual or they would proactively impose. These three principal, prima facie, positive, libertarian rules fit abstract liberty almost perfectly. They maximally internalise externalities with respect to want-satisfaction, and are thereby economically efficient (tending to maximise overall want-satisfaction). To flout these positive rules infringes liberty prima facie. However, problem cases may require the abstract theory or maximisation policy. In order to better protect and promote liberty in practice, the above positive rules can be instituted as enforceable private property (one added sophistication is similarly derivable intellectual property). Consequently, self-ownership and such private property are contingent, practical, libertarian rules; and not what liberty or even libertarianism is inherently. Moreover, it is a further separate and normative matter whether this positive system of liberty-in-practice is moral, just, rights-observing, etc. And, as with the positive theory, this can only be conjecturally explained and defended-not given epistemological support. A more-detailed explanation of this liberty-centred, critical-rationalist, theory is here.